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violation of his legal right by the statute or order which is
attacked. (Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 [42 Sup.
Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078] ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302
U. S. 464 [58 Sup. Ct. 300, 82 L. Ed. 374].)
For example, in Wallace v. Ganley, 95 Fed. (2d) 364, a
group of producers sought to enjoin the enforcement of an
order regulating milk which was issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act as
amended in 1935, supra. The order fixed minimum prices
to be paid to the producers by the handlers. The producers
attacked both the constitutionality of the statute and the
validity of the order. It was held that the producers had
no standing to maintain the suit as they were unable to show
any wrongful act which directly resulted in a violation of
their legal rights. So here, although the growers may be
a ble to show certain damage arising from the restrictions
imposed upon shippers by the order, they have suffered no
legal wrong for the order does not directly affect them in
its regulation. Consequently, they are in no position to
challenge its validity.
Let a writ of prohibition issue as prayed for by the petitioners.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Traynor, J., concurred. Carter, J., concurred in the conclusion.
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is no such compliance where a claim filed does not specify the
place of the accident.
[2] Id.-Claims-Demand-Waiver of Defects.-Since a city is
powerless to waive compliance with the requirements of the
act relating to claims against cities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475;
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5149), respecting the filing of a
verified claim for damages resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of any pUblic streets, etc., actual knowledge
of the city officials of the facts required to be stated in such
a claim does not dispense with the filing of a· proper claim.
[3] Id.-Actions-Pleading-Insufficiency of Claim.-A city sued
for personal injuries sustained through a fall upon a sidewalk is not precluded from relying on the defense of the
insufficiency of the claim filed because of its failU:re specially
to plead such defense in its answer, where the sufficiency of
the claim is placed in issue by a denial of the allegation of
the filing of a claim.
[4] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Burden of Proof-Filing of Claim.
A plaintiff suing a city for damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained through a fall upon a sidewalk has the burden of proving compliance with the act relating to claims
against cities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 5149), respecting the filing of a claim with the city; and
where he fails to sustain such burden, a judgment of dismissal
is properly entered.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles Gounty~. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed.
Porter C. Blackburn for Appellant.

[L. A. No. 17952. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1941.]

MARY E.HALL, Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
(a Municipal Corporation), Respond'ent.
[1] Municipal Corporations - Claims - Demand - Sufficiency Specification of Place of Accident.-There must be a substantial compliance with the act relating to claims against municipalities (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 5149), before an action for damages for injuries resulting
from a defective sidewalk or street can be maintained. There

[1] See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 638; 19 R. C. L. 1040.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 453 (3);
[2] Municipal Corporations, § 453; [3,4] Municipal Corporations,
§469.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schradel',
Assistant City Attorney, and Norman Brand, Louis A. Babior
and Victor P. Spero, Deputies City Attorney, for Respondent.
THE COURT.-A petition for hearing in this ease was
granted to the end that further consideration be given to
the contentions of the appellant. On such consideration we
agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court
of Appeal of the Second Appellate District and adopt as
the opinion of this court the opinion of that court prepared
by Justice [W. J.] Wood with the modifications that hereinafter appear:

I
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"Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered in her action to recover damages for personal injur~c~l
alleged to have resulted from the defective condition of a
sidewalk under the control of the defendant city.
"Plaintiff suffered her injuries on September 14, 1938,
when she slipped on some mud or other slippery substance
which was covered with leaves or debris. She seeks to recover damages under the provisions of the Public Liability Act
of 1923. (Stats.1923, p. 675; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619.)
The complaint contains the allegations usual in such actions
and in particular it is alleged that the accident occurred on the
sidewalk at the corner of Union Drive and Sixth Street in
the City of Los Angeles and that plaintiff had regularly filed
her claim for damages with the defendant city. In its answer defendant denies all of the material allegations of the
complaint. Upon the issue as to the regularity of the claim
filed with defendant plaintiff proved that on November 9,
1938, the following verified claim for damages was filed with
defendant: 'To Mrs. Mary E. Hall, Address c/o Porter C.
Blackburn, 1314 Washington Bldg., Los Angeles. Sept. 14,
1938. Personal injuries received from slipping on sidewalk
which was covered with mud, leaves and debris, resulting in
injury and fracture to spinal column: Damages: Medical expenses $500; permanent injury $5000; loss of earnings $2500$8000.00. '
"Defendant objected to the introduction of any further
evidence on behalf of plaintiff on the ground that the foregoing claim failed to state the place where the accident happened and therefore did not comply with the provisions of
the 1931 statute (Stats. 1931, p. 2475; Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 5149) relating to claims for personal injuries against municipalities. Prior to a ruling by the court on such objection
plaintiff offered in evidence the following letter which she had
received from the city clerk of defendant city about two weeks
before the present action was commenced: 'Greetings: At
the meeting of the Council held this day, the following report
of the Finance Committee, was adopted: "In the matter of the
claim of Mary E. Hall, in the amount of $8,000.00, for damages
because of personal injuries alleged to have been received
when she slipped on a muddy sidewalk at the corner of Union
Drive and Sixth Street, on September 14, 1938: The City
Attorney reports that after making a complete investigation
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of this matter, he is of the opinion that there is no municipal
liability involved, and recommends that the claim he denied.
We recommend,' in view of the City Attorney's report, that
said claim be denied and the matter filed.'"
The Court sustained defendant's objection and thereafter '_entered the
judgment of dismissal from which the appeal is taken.
[1] "We are called upon to decide whether or not the
claim filed by plaintiff sufficiently complies with the provisions of Deering's General Laws, Act 5149, to enable her to
maintain this action. Section 1 of this act provides: 'Whenever it is claimed that any person has been injured or any
property damaged as a result of the dangerous f5p defective
condition of any public street, highway, building, park,
grounds, wor ks or property, a verified .claim for damages
shall be presented in writing and filed with the clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the municipality, county,
city and county, or school district, as the case may be, within
ninety days after such accident has occurred. Such claim
shall specify the name and address of the claimant, the date
and place of the accident and the extent of the injuries or
damages received.' Defendant contends that the failure of
plaintiff to specify the place of the accident in the claim is
fatal to iter right to maintain the present action.
"Compliance with the statute referred to is mandatory and
there must be at least a substantial compliance with its provisions before a suit for damages for personal injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk or street may be maintained
against the City. (Cooper v. County Of Butte, 17 Cal. App.
(2d) 43 [61 Pac. (2d) 516]; Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. & S.
ll. Ry. Co., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 215 [82 Pac. (2d) 216].)
"It is contended by plaintiff that the notice in question
substantially complied with the requirements of the act and
that since the city officials actually investigated and discovered the place where the accident occurred, tn.e city was
not misled by her failure to designate the place of the accident in the claim. In support of this proposition plaintiff
relies principally upon Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. & S. ll. By.
Co., supra, and Kelso v. Board of Educa.tion, 42 Cal. App.
(2d) 415 [109 Pac. (2d) 29]. In the Sandstoe case this
court. held that a claim (apparently complete and regular
on its face) which was filed in duplicate with the city cono

.
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troller and the city clerk at the same time substantially complied with the requirement of the city charter that the claim
must be filed with the legislative body within 30 days after
rejection by the city controller. The claim under consideration in the Kelso case met the statutory requirements in all
respects except that it was verified by plaintiff's father instead of by the minor plaintiff and it was held that a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute had
been made."
In each of these cases there was compliance with all of
the requirements enumerated by the statute, but the manner
Qf complying with one of them was derective. The courts
held that a defect in the form of compliance is not ratal so
long as there is substantial compliance with the essentials of
the requirement. In the present case, however, there is an
~ntire failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with one
~f the mandates of the statute. Substantial compliance canI'lot be predicated upon no compliance. A contrary holding
would permit a claimant to bring suit against a city on the
basis of a claim that included none of the information required by the statute if he offered to show that the city acquired the information independently of the claim. Such
a holding would emasculate the statute.
The present case is governed not by the doctrine of substantial compliance but "by the principles enunciated in
Oooper v. County of Butte, supra, and Sperwer v. City of
Calipatria,9 Cal. App. (2d) 267 (49 Pac. (2d) 3201· In each
of these cases it was held that the filing of an unverified claim
is not a substantial compliance with the requirements of the
statute. The failure to state the place of the accident is as
serious a defect as is the failure to verify the claim. Indeed
no part of the claim can be of more importance to the city
officials than that part which gives them information to enable them to locate the point where the alleged accident occurred and to make proper investigation of the condition of
the pI"emises. In a number of jurisdictions it has been held
that a claim is fatally defective if it fails to designate the
pla~e of the accident in such manner as to enable the officials
to locate it. (Atkinson v. City of Indianapolis, 101 Ind. App.
620 [192 N. E. 1571 ; Cronin v. City of Boston, 135 Mass.
110; Village of Dawson v. Estrop, 243 Ill. App. 552; Benson
v. City of Madison, 101 Wis. 312 [77 N. W. 1611 ; Reichert
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v. City of Chicago, 169 Ill. App. 493, and Purdy v. Oity of
New York, 193 N. Y. 521 [86 N. E. 561].) We must therefore hold that .the entire failure to designate in the claim
the place where the accident occurred constituted such a failure to comply with the statutory requirements as to preclude plaintiff from maintaining the present action.
[2] "Plaintiff's contention that defendant by investig-ating and rejecting the claim waived any defects therein cannot be sustained. In the Spencer case, supra, an unverified
claim was filed with the city and after investigation the city
made an offer of compromise which plaintiff rejected. At
no time did the city object to the defective form of plaintiff's
claim. In holding that the city was not estopped to assert
the defense of failure to comply with the statutory requirements relative to the claim the court observed that the city
was powerless to waive compliance with the statutory provisions. The holding of the Spencer case was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Douglass v. Oity of Los
.Angeles,5 Cal. (2d) 123 [53 Pac. (2d) 353], and was declared
to be the law in all cases coming within its purview. Since
the city is powerless to waive a compliance with the statute,
actual know ledge on the part of the city officials of the facts
required to be stated in the claim does not dispense with the
filing of a proper claim. (Kline v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist'rict, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 174 [104 Pac. (2d) 661] u)
[3] "Plaintiff's final contention is t'hat defendant is
estopped to raise the defense of the insufficiency of the claim
because of its failure to specially plead such defense in :,the
answer. This proposition must be rejected for the question
as to the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim was placed in issue.
by defendant's general denial of plaintiff's allegation that
she had filed her claim with the city. [4] Since the statutory requirements are mandatory and compliance therewitn
is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a suit for the damages claimed (Cooper v. County of Butte, supra, and Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry. Co., supra), the burden o,f
proof of such compliance was on plaintiff. Since plaintiff
failed to sustain this burden the court properly entered the
judgment of dismissaL"
The judgment is affirmed..
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
The majority opinion is contrary to every concept of fairness and good faith. If a similar situation were presented in
which an individual or private entity rather than a municipal
corporation were involved it would be unhesitatingly held that
there had been a substantial compliance, or that the defendant was estopped to assert the insufficiency of the claim, or
that there was a waiver of the alleged defect therein. Surely
a government agency should be at least as much bound, if
not more, than an individual by the requirements of equity,
justice and fair dealing. Indeed, such agency should be 'held
to a higher standard of fairness as a matter of example for
others. When this case was before the District Court of
Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, Mr. Justice McComb of that court wrote a very able dissenting
opinion which I am adopting as a part of my dissenting
opinion in this case. He said:
"There are two rules supported by respectable authority
which in my view are controlling in the present case.
I' First: Substantial compliance with t'he requirements of
section 1 of Act 5149, Deering's General Laws, 1931, is
sufficient to permit an injured person to maintain an action
against a municipality. (Kelso v. Board of Education, 42
Cal. App. (2d) 415, 422 [109 Pac. (2d) 29]; Sandstoe v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 00., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 215, 220
[82 Pac. (2d) 216].)
"Second: When a claim has been filed with a municipality,
full investigation made thereof and the claim rejected for
some reason not connected with the form of notice or its contents, the notice has performed its function and defects
therein can no longer be relied upon to prevent a recovery.
(Bowles v. Oity of Richmond, 147 Va. 720 [129 S. E. 489,
133 S. E. 593, 595] ; Bowman v. Ogden Oity, 33 Utah 196
[93 Pac. 561, 564] ; Nevala v. Oity of Ironwood, 232 Mieh.
316 [205 N. W. 93, 94, 50 A. L. R. 1189] ; Greenberg v. City
of ~T aterbury, 117 Conn. 67 [167 Atl. 83, 84] ; Lindley v.
Oity of Detroit, 138 Mich. 8 [90 N. W. 665] ; Hunter v. Village of Durand, 137 Mich. 53 [100 N. W. 191, 192].)
"Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present
case, we find, as stated by this court in Sandstoe v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., supra, at page 223, that 'the purpose of
filing a claim against the city is to enable city officials to make
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proper investigation concerning the merits of the claim and
to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit if settlement
should be shown to be proper.' That such is the purpose
underlying the requirement is clear. (Uttley v. Oity of Santa
Ana, 136 Cal. App. 23 [28 Pac. (2d) 377]; Wagner v. City
of Seattle, 84 Wash. 275 [146 Pac. 621, Ann. Cas. 1916E,
720] .)
"From the statements contained in the letter in the present case from respondent's clerk notifying plaintiff of denial of her claim, it is apparent that respondent was not misled by failure of the claim to specify the place where the
accident took' place. The letter describes the precise place
where the accident occurred and· refers to a 'complete investigation' of the matter by the city attorney. The purpose
of the statute in requiring the filing of a claim was therefore
in fact accomplished, although the claim itself was defective.
There is no evidence of any intention on the part of plaintiff
to .mislead defendant by filing a defective claim. So far as
the record discloses, plaintiff filed such a claim in a bona fide
attempt to comply with the statutory requirements. Under
such circumstances where, as here, there is no evidence that
such clajm did in fact mislead the municipality, it will be
deemed sufficient to enable plaintiff to maintain an action
against the city following the rejection of such claim.
(Kelso v. Board of Education, supra; Sandstoe v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. 00., sup'ra.)
"The principle underlying the rule is well stated in Decker
v. Oity of Seattle, 80 Wash. 137 [141 Pac. 338, at page 339],
where it is said (quoting from Hammock v. Tacoma, 40 Wash.
539 [82 Pa~ 893]):
'" ~ .. where there has been a bona fide effort to comply
with the statute, and t'here has been no intention to mislead,
it is a sound and just rule which opens the door of the court
to an inquiry whether the notice did in fact mislead. If it
did not in fact mislead, but if its deficiencies or mistakes
were helped out by other information given to the proper
officers, or by other knowledge on their [the city's] part, no
matter how acquired, then it would turn the statute into
a mere trap for the ignorant and unskillful, to deprive them
of a right of action because of failing to do something which
caused the municipality no injury and put it to no disadvantage. '
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"In addition, the case clearly falls within prOVISIOns of
the second rule above stated, to wit, that, where the municipality has, as in the present case, received a defective claim,
made full investigation of the accident, and then rejected
it for reasons other than a defect in the form of notice or its
contents, the city is estopped from relying upon a defect
in the notice of claim to prevent recovery in an action subsequently brought. (See numerous cases above cited.)
"For the foregoing reasons in my opinion the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed."
In addition to the cases cited in Mr. Justice McComb's dissenting opinion, see: Barton v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash.
331 [194 Pac. 961]; Cawthon v. City of Houston, (Tex.
Com. App.) 231 S. W. 701; Draper v. Village of Springwells,
235 Mich. 168 [209 N. W. 150] ; Naze v. Town of Hudson, 250
Mass. 368 [145 N. E. 468].
It has been repeatedly declared by the courts of this state
that the purpose, aim and object of the claim statute here
involved is twofold, namely, to enable the city to investigate
the accident and conditions causing it, and to compromise
or pay the claim if it deems it expedient, thus avoiding the
expense of litigation. No other purposes have ever been
mentioned. In the instant case the purposes of the statute
have been wholly satisfied and fulfilled. There can be and
is no dispute on that subject. The city made a complete
and thorough investigation of the accident and gave consideration to the claim and rejected it. There is not a vestige of any detriment or disadvantage having been suffered
by the city. There is not a single act or thing the city could
or would have done had the claim been more complete. On
the other hand, the plaintiff under the majority opinion suffers great and irreparable damage. She is absolutely foreclosed from having a determination of her case On the merits.
What purpose or reason can be given to sustain the conclusion reached in the majority opinion? I submit that there
is nothing but the most specious argument based upon a
fine-spun technicality. It has always been my opinion that
all the law whether enacted by the Legislature, or as interpreted by the courts, is based upon reasonableness and justice. Indeed, that principle has been declared by the courts
in a legion of cases. One of the ramifications of that principle is that form and technicality shall not render the courts
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impotent to rectify wrongs even when it is necessary to look
through a maze of technicalities to protect substantive rights.
As I have stated, there is a substantial compliance with
the statute in this case and the city is estopped from asserting that the claim is defective. This is not conferring a
power upon the city which it does not possess, or making
lawful ultra vires acts. The city has the power and the
duty to pay just claims for injuries due to dangerous or
defective condition of its property. It has the power and
duty to pass upon such claims. It inescapably follows that
it has the power, inherent and implicit in those general
powers, to pass directly or indirectly, upon the sufficiency
of those claims. { True, the statute states that the filing of
a claim is a condition precedent to the city's liability, but
even if it be said that when no claim has been filed the city
has no power to admit liability and pay damages for the
injury suffered, yet there is a vast difference between no
claim and a defective claim. If a claim has been filed, that
condition prerequisite· to liability has been satisfied, the dormant power of the city to act has been activated and brought
into existence. Henceforward, it has power to determine the
sufficiency of that claim. That determination may be evidenced by express action by the city on that specific subject,
or by conduct of the city or its officials which constitutes
an implied finding or determination that the claim is in proper
form. Such implied determination may arise from the application of the doctrines of either waiver or estoppel. An
analogous situation might be imagined in the instance of
a court which has general jurisdiction or power to adjudicate
tort actions. If no complaint is filed, it has no power on
its own initiative to grant or refuse recovery to the injured
person. But once a complaint has been filed its general
power enables it to pass upon the sufficiency of that claim
for relief. Merely because the claim was defective in that
it lacked some indispensable element would not mean that
the court was ousted from jurisdiction, or deprived of its
power to pass upon the sufficiency of the claim.
In the case at bar it is conceded that plaintiff filed a claim
with the proper official of the city of Los Angeles within
sixty days after she received the injury complained of. This
claim was fully investigated by the city and rejected upon
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the advice of the city attorney. The notice of rejection of
said claim is as follows:
"Greetings: At the meeting of the Council held this day,
the following report of the Finance Committee, was adopted:
'In the matter of the claim of J\1ary E. Hall, in the amount
of $8,000.00, for damages because of personal injuries alleged to have been received when she slipped on a muddy
sidewalk at the Gorner of Union D1"ive and Sixth Street, on
September 14, 1938: The City Attorney reports that after
making a complete investigation of this matter, he is of the
opinion that there is no municipal liability involved, and
recommends that the claim he denied. We recommend, in
view of the City Attorney's report, that said claim be denied
and the matter filed '."
It will be observed from the foregoing notice of rejection
that the place where the accident occurred was known to the
city officials and t'hat the claim was rejected upon the advice
of the city attorney' "that there is no municipal liability
involved. " The form or substance of the claim was not
questioned by the city officials until after this action was
commenced.
To 'hold, under the circumstances of this case, that ,plaintiff is denied recovery because she failed to file a sufficient
claim is, in my opinion; substituting form for substance and
technicality for common sense. Such result was obviously
never intended by the framers of the statutory provision here
involved.
In my opinion the judgment should he reversed.
Houser, J., concurred in the foregoing conclusion.
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S. B. BASTAJIAN, as Administrator With the Will Annexed, etc., Appellant, v. JAMES E. BROWN et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Judgments-Change-Judicial Errors: Opening and Vacating
-Grounds for Relief-Judicial Error-Judgments Inadvertently Made.-Independently of a statute, a trial court has
power to correct mistakes and to annul orders and judgments
inadvertently or improvidently made. While a court has
power to vacate judgments and orders inadvertently made
which are not actually the result of the exercise of judgment,
it has no power, having once made its decision after regular
submission, to set aside or amend judicial errors except under
appropriate statutory proceedings.
[2] Id.-Opening and Vacating - Procedure - Review - Judge's
Declaration.-In passing on the question as to whether the
entry of findings and judgment was judicial error which
could not be corrected more than one year after the entry
thereof, the reviewing court cannot wholly disregard or
lightly brush aside the declaration of the trial judge and
finding in the order vacating the judgment that the findings
and judgment did not conform to the true judgment rendered.
[3] Id.-Opening and Vacating-Procedure - Evidence-Judge's
Recollection.-In vacating or correcting a clerical error or
mistake, the trial judge may give effect to his own recollection
[4] Id.-Opening and Vacating-Errors - Clerical Errors-Procedure - Evidence - Minute Entry.-While a· minute entry
made shortly after trial in which the judgment is ordered for
a defendant is not the decision or judgment of the court and
the opinion thereby expressed is not binding upon it, yet it
is evidence of the intent of the court as to the decision,
findings of fact and conclusions of law he intended ultimately
to make. It may be inferred from such an entry that his
intent was the same when he in fact did sign findings, and
where those findings were contrary to the intention so expressed, the signing thereof was clerical error.
[1] See 14 Cal Jur. 1019; 31 Am. Jur. 279.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §§ 130, 133, 164 (3),
165; [2] Judgments, § 226; [3] Judgments, § 217 (2); [4] Judgments, §§ 164, 217 (2); [5] Judgments,§ 164 (3); [6] Appeala,nd
Error, § 1298.

